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DRUG-DRUG INTERACTION ALERTS: 
EMPHASIZING THE EVIDENCE 
SHARONA HOFFMAN* AND ANDY PODGURSKI** 
INTRODUCTION 
Many analysts and users of contemporary clinical decision support 
(“CDS”) systems have expressed grave concerns about the technology’s 
efficacy and functionality.1  Alerts generated by CDS systems are often 
inaccurate, and an excess of alerts, especially those of dubious quality, 
leads some physicians to experience “alert fatigue” and to turn off CDS 
altogether.2  Susan Ridgely and Michael Greenberg undertake an important 
project in formulating recommendations to promote CDS improvements.3  
They have written a thoughtful and well-researched article that focuses on 
drug-drug interaction (“DDI”) alerts, and they correctly identify liability 
concerns as a hindrance to the alerts’ optimal implementation.4 
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University School of Law; B.A., Wellesley College; J.D., Harvard Law School; L.L.M. in Health 
Law, University of Houston. 
** Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Case Western Reserve 
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 1. Kim R. Saverno et al., Ability of Pharmacy Clinical Decision-Support Software to Alert 
Users About Clinically Important Drug–Drug Interactions, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 
32, 35 (2011) (“This CDS software evaluation study provides insight into the poor 
performance of pharmacy systems in alerting pharmacists of clinically significant drug 
interactions.”); Randy C. Hatton et al., Evaluation of Contraindicated Drug-Drug Interaction 
Alerts in a Hospital Setting, 45 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 297, 298 (2011) (“Drug-drug 
interaction alerts have been shown to be often misclassified, and the importance of many of 
these supposed interactions has been questioned.”). 
 2. Laurel Taylor & Robyn Tamblyn, Reasons for Physician Non-Adherence to Electronic 
Drug Alerts, in MEDINFO 2004:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH WORLD CONGRESS ON MEDICAL 
INFORMATICS 1103-04 (Marius Fieschi et al. eds., 2004); Frédéric Mille et al., Analysis of 
Overridden Alerts in A Drug-Drug Interaction Detection System, 20 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH 
CARE 400, 402-04 (2008); Heleen van der Sijs et al., Turning Off Frequently Overridden Drug 
Alerts:  Limited Opportunities for Doing It Safely, 15 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 439, 439 
(2008); Hatton et al., supra note 1, at 305-06. 
 3. M. Susan Ridgely & Michael D. Greenberg, Too Many Alerts, Too Much Liability:  
Sorting Through the Malpractice Implications of Drug-Drug Interaction Clinical Decision 
Support, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 257 (2012). 
 4. Id.; Hatton et al., supra note 1, at 305-06; Saverno et al., supra note 1, at 36. 
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Ridgely and Greenberg outline a five-part strategy to diminish liability 
concerns and thereby promote CDS improvements.  We will critique the 
primary elements of their proposal and formulate several original 
recommendations. 
In general, Ridgely and Greenberg call for the development of a 
consensus-based “clinically significant drug-drug interaction list” that could 
generate limited liability protection for users.5  DDIs have been defined 
elsewhere as “drug combinations resulting in pharmacological or clinical 
response, which differs from responses to the agents when either is given 
alone,”6  and “clinically important” DDIs have been described as those 
“most likely to cause harm if not detected.”7 
Ridgely and Greenberg do not fully explain what they mean by a 
clinically significant DDI list, and thus, their liability protection proposal is 
somewhat difficult to assess.  Would the list consist only of DDIs that are 
always contraindicated?  Would the list include DDIs that will adversely 
affect only some patients?  Will alerts provide prescribers with information 
that will enable them to determine whether the drug combination can or 
cannot be safely prescribed to particular patients? 
In Part I we address the notion of a clinically significant DDI list.8  We 
support efforts to eliminate excessive DDI alerts and to reach consensus as 
to which DDIs should generate alerts.  However, a simple list of drug 
combinations that are always contraindicated would not go far enough and 
could, in some circumstances, be misleading because it would ignore the 
complexity and highly individualized nature of most treatment choices.  
Instead, DDI warnings should provide users with concise but comprehensive 
information that will enable them to make more knowledgeable and 
effective prescribing decisions.  Thus, from both clinical and malpractice 
liability perspectives, it is important that DDI alerts offer essential information 
about DDI risks, supporting evidence, mitigating factors, and appropriate 
courses of action. 
In Part II, we analyze the process for determining which DDIs should 
generate alerts in CDS systems.9  We agree with Ridgely and Greenberg’s 
recommendation that experts who represent a variety of professional 
organizations be tasked with developing DDI alert information, but we argue 
 
 5. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 264. 
 6. Leanne Reimche et al., Incidence and Contributors to Potential Drug-Drug Interactions 
in Hospitalized Patients, 51 J.  CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1043, 1043 (2011). 
 7. Daniel C. Malone et al., Identification of Serious Drug-Drug Interactions: Results of 
the Partnership to Prevent Drug-Drug Interactions, 44 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N 142, 143 
(2004). 
 8. See infra p. 299. 
 9. See infra p. 303. 
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that the government must play a key role in the process.10  In Part III we 
assess the use of DDI alert compliance data as evidence in malpractice 
litigation and as a basis for liability protection.11 
I.  CRAFTING USEFUL DDI ALERTS 
Ridgely and Greenberg are right to identify alert fatigue and the 
resulting tendency of physicians to turn off DDI alerts as endangering patient 
welfare.12  To address this problem, they seek to limit the number of alerts 
that physicians receive and to assure prescribers about the alerts’ 
reliability.13  Their proposal is anchored in the creation of a list of clinically 
significant DDIs that experts and the government will endorse and that CDS-
system vendors will routinely include in their systems.14  In this section we 
argue that a list of drug combinations that are consistently contraindicated 
would not provide much, if any, benefit to clinicians and patients. We also 
formulate recommendations for an alternative approach to DDI alerts. 
A. Feasibility of a National DDI List 
A shortcoming of the Ridgely and Greenberg article is that they do not 
explain what they mean by a “clinically significant DDI list.”15  If what they 
mean is a list of drug combinations that are inappropriate in all 
circumstances, which we will call “always contraindicated DDIs,” such a list 
would be of limited use because it could not adequately reflect the 
complexity of many treatment decisions.  The risk of DDIs often varies from 
patient to patient and could be influenced by factors such as an individual’s 
age, sex, kidney function, liver function, genetic makeup, and disease, as 
well as by the medication’s dose and route of administration.16  
Furthermore, sometimes the risks of a DDI must be tolerated because the 
benefits of a drug combination outweigh them, and physicians will manage 
 
 10. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 264; see infra pp. 303-5. 
 11. See infra p. 306. 
 12. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 258; van der Sijs et al., supra note 2, at 447 
(concluding that “hospital-wide DDI alert suppression” is not advisable). 
 13. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 262. 
 14. Id. at 279. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Eric N. van Roon et al., Clinical Relevance of Drug-Drug Interactions: A Structured 
Assessment Procedure, 28 DRUG SAFETY 1131, 1135 (2005); Ylva Böttiger et al., SFINX – A 
Drug-Drug Interaction Database Designed for Clinical Decision Support Systems, 65 EUR. J. 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 627, 631 (2009); Hanna Marita Seidling et al., Successful Strategy 
to Improve the Specificity of Electronic Statin-Drug Interaction Alerts, 65 EUR. J. CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY 1149, 1154 (2009); Dan M. Roden & Alfred L. George, Jr., The Genetic 
Basis of Variability in Drug Responses, 1 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 37, 38 (2002). 
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the risks by monitoring the patient carefully in order to prevent harm.17  One 
source provides the example of patients with both coronary artery disease 
and atrial fibrillation who “may require ASA to prevent myocardial infarction 
and warfarin for stroke prevention” even though these are two interacting 
drugs.18 
Moreover, there is insufficient scientific evidence as to which DDIs truly 
create severe risks for patients. Thus, even a group of highly qualified 
experts are unlikely to agree upon a list of always-contraindicated DDIs.  A 
variety of sources can provide DDI information, but the data is often 
inconsistent or unreliable. The sources include manufacturers’ drug 
pamphlets,19 several drug compendia,20 articles in the medical literature,21 
medical databases,22 and clinical experts. Papers and clinical trials that 
claim to establish the existence of interactions may be of varying quality, 
and in some instances, interactions are assumed based only on theory and 
analogy.23 Researchers have not thoroughly studied many drug 
combinations, and the major drug compendia often differ as to which DDIs 
are worth listing and as to their severities.24 
One study focused on 458 drug pairs and found that proprietary 
databases rated 7.4% of interactions (34/458) as severe, and clinicians 
assessed 6.6% (30/458) as severe,25 but only three interactions were 
considered severe by both the databases and clinicians.26  A different study 
used a panel of experts to evaluate DDIs and found that the experts initially 
agreed “on the clinical significance of an interaction approximately 50% of 
the time.”27 
 
 17. Reimche et al., supra note 6, at 1047. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Hatton et al., supra note 1, at 298. 
 20. Malone et al., supra note 7, at 144 (naming the following DDI compendia, 
Evaluation of Drug Interactions, Drug Interaction Facts, Drug Interactions: Analysis and 
Management, and MICROMEDEX: (DRUG-REAX), and noting that they “provide inconsistent 
classification to determine which interactions are clinically important”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. van Roon et al., supra note 16, at 1133. 
 23. Id. at 1134. 
 24. Saverno et al., supra note 1, at 35. 
 25. Pamela L. Smithburger et al., Grading the Severity of Drug-Drug Interactions in the 
Intensive Care Unit:  A Comparison Between Clinician Assessment and Proprietary Database 
Severity Rankings, 44 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 1718, 1720 (2010). 
 26. Id.  The three were atazanavir-simvastatin, atazanavir-tenofovir, and aspirin-warfarin.  
Id. 
 27. Wendy D. Smith et al., Evaluation of Drug Interaction Software to Identify Alerts for 
Transplant Medications, 39 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 45, 47 (2005); see also Rekha 
Gaikwad et al., Evaluation of Accuracy of Drug Interaction Alerts Triggered by Two Electronic 
Medical Record Systems in Primary Healthcare, 13 HEALTH INFORMATICS J. 163, 175 (2007) 
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Even if experts could formulate a list of always-contraindicated DDIs, the 
list would probably be very short and would fail to provide physicians with 
significant prescribing guidance.  One project, which evaluated DDI alerts 
based on a literature review and the opinions of an expert panel, concluded 
that only 15.3% of the DDI alerts studied “were for medications that should 
never be used together.”28  A study of four drug interaction compendia 
revealed that only 2% of the major known interactions were found in all 
four.29 
B. Constructing Useful DDI Alerts 
In our view, an approach that provides physicians with information that 
enables them to assess the desirability of prescribing potentially interacting 
drug combinations would be far superior to a rigid DDI list, with respect to 
both medical benefits and reduction in liability risks for providers and CDS-
system vendors.  In the majority of cases, there is no certainty that a patient 
will suffer an adverse consequence from a DDI, rather, there is only some 
risk that this will happen.30 
The Netherlands has developed a model that could be emulated in the 
United States.  DDI alerts provide users with text that assists them in 
managing interactions, and the text can be tailored to different types of 
providers: prescribers, pharmacies, and hospitals.31  Prescribers are given 
information about alternative drugs and ways to adjust patient monitoring.32  
Users can also consult general background material for information about: 
(1) evidence of the DDI; (2) clinical relevance of the possible adverse DDI 
consequences; (3) specific risk factors associated with patient characteristics, 
the disease, and the drug; and (4) the adverse reaction’s rate of incidence.33  
The text also discusses the mechanism of interactions and briefly summarizes 
the literature addressing the DDI, and simple codes indicate the quality of 
the evidence and the seriousness of the adverse outcome (e.g. “4F” – high 
quality published evidence and very clinically relevant adverse reaction).34 
A similar approach could be adopted in the United States.  In lieu of a 
national DDI list, providers should have access to well-presented, concise 
information that will enable them to make appropriate decisions about the 
 
(finding that “there was no universality in the severity rating scales for drug interactions used 
by the drug information software programs”). 
 28. Hatton et al., supra note 1, at 298-99. 
 29. Saverno et al., supra note 1, at 35-36. 
 30. See Malone et al., supra note 7, at 144. 
 31. van Roon et al., supra note 16, at 1136. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1133, 1136. 
 34. Id. at 1136. 
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treatment of their particular patients.  Patient data stored in electronic health 
records (“EHR”) should play a vital role in determining when DDI warnings 
will be issued.  Such data is essential in many cases both to triggering 
appropriate warnings and to preventing inappropriate warnings.  In general, 
both the risk of an adverse drug reaction due to a DDI and the quality of the 
evidence concerning the risk may depend on a number of patient-specific 
risk factors, some or all of which may be recorded in a patient’s EHR.35  If 
information about particular risk factors is absent from the EHR, the CDS 
system should prompt for it by suggesting that doctors conduct further 
testing or question patients about it.  It is important to note that the reliability 
of DDI alerts will also depend on the accuracy of the data in patients’ EHR, 
which may be compromised by input errors, omissions, and other 
problems.36 
In addition, experts could develop codes that accompany DDI alerts, 
indicating the quality of the evidence (including patient-specific factors) for 
an adverse DDI reaction and the severity of the potential adverse reaction 
(e.g. 4F). 37  According to the medical literature, there is evidence that 
tiering or stratifying DDIs by severity increases prescriber compliance with 
alerts.38  Having seen the code and the initial warning text, users should be 
able to click on the alert to access more detailed information that appears in 
a concise and easily understandable form.  Ideally, clinicians would always 
look at the additional material, but in some cases, prescribers may feel that 
they are familiar with both the DDI and the particular patient and are too 
busy to read the literature summaries.  A quick glance at the code would 
enable them to confirm their conclusion or prompt them to further 
investigate the potential adverse outcome. 
Since many DDIs are influenced by multiple risk factors, experts may not 
be able to enumerate the risk levels and quality of evidence associated with 
 
 35. Taofikat B. Agbabiaka et al., Methods for Causality Assessment of Adverse Drug 
Reactions: A Systematic Review, 31 DRUG SAFETY 21, 21-22 (2008); Johan Hopstadius et al., 
Impact of Stratification on Adverse Drug Reaction Surveillance, 31 DRUG SAFETY 1035, 1037-
38 (2008); G. Niklaus Norén et al., Temporal Pattern Discovery in Longitudinal Electronic 
Patient Records, 20 DATA MINING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 361, 362 (2010); Yurdaguel Zopf 
et al., Risk Factors Associated with Adverse Drug Reactions Following Hospital Admission: A 
Prospective Analysis of 907 Patients in Two German University Hospitals, 31 DRUG SAFETY 
789, 790 (2008). 
 36. Krish Thiru et al., Systematic Review of Scope and Quality of Electronic Patient Record 
Data in Primary Care, BRIT. MED. J., 1 (May 17, 2003), http://www.bmj.com/highwire/file 
stream/355762/field_highwire_article_pdf/0.pdf; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-
Health Hazards:  Provider Liability and Electronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1523, 1544-45 (2009) [hereinafter Hoffman & Podgurski, E-Health Hazards]. 
 37. See infra p. 306, for discussion of the role of experts. 
 38. Marilyn D. Paterno et al., Tiering Drug–Drug Interaction Alerts by Severity Increases 
Compliance Rates, 16 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 40, 44-45 (2009). 
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every possible combination of risk factors for each DDI.  The total number 
of such combinations could be very large.  However, it may be possible for 
experts to develop an algorithm or a statistical model (or set of models) for 
predicting a patient’s risk for an adverse DDI based on appropriate risk 
factors and strength of evidence.39 
Alert fatigue should not be addressed by allowing doctors to suppress or 
turn off alerts because such options may cause doctors to miss critical 
warnings altogether.40  Turning off alerts could thus compromise patient 
care and increase liability exposure for doctors. Warnings should be 
noticeable but unobtrusive and should not be time-consuming or complicate 
physicians’ EHR work.  A doctor who has previously received the same 
warning but knows her patient tolerates the medications well should not 
have to spend significant time processing the alert.  Further discussion of the 
user interface is beyond the scope of this article, and the technical design of 
DDI alerts will require the skill of highly qualified experts. 
No extensive list of always-contraindicated DDIs is likely to be 
developed.  In most cases, DDI alerts can at best provide prescribers with 
information that facilitates their decision-making process. Improved design 
and usability of alerts would not only provide prescribers with more accurate 
and helpful information, but also reduce clinicians’ frustration and alert 
fatigue. In addition, it is critical for vendors of CDS systems to eliminate 
excessive DDI warnings.  To that end, professional organizations and the 
federal government could provide expert input, oversight, and even 
regulatory guidance for DDI alerts, as detailed in the following section. 
II.  EXPERT INPUT 
Ridgely and Greenberg wisely call for a national expert process to 
develop DDI alert information.41  At this time in the United States, vendors of 
CDS systems generally rely on various commercial databases or “knowledge 
bases” to create their DDI alerts,42 and many commentators have noted that 
 
 39. Agbabiaka et al., supra note 35, at 26-27; Martin J. Doherty, Algorithms for 
Assessing the Probability of an Adverse Drug Reaction, 2 RESPIRATORY MED. CME 63, 64 
(2009). 
 40. See van der Sijs et al., supra note 2, at 447 (suggesting that turning off alerts may 
pose dangers to patient welfare). 
 41. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 279. 
 42. Smithburger et al., supra note 25, at 1719 (discussing the Micromedex and Lexi-
Interact databases); Hatton et al., supra note 1, at 299 (discussing DDIs “from a commercial 
knowledge base vendor”); Nidhi R. Shah et al., Improving Acceptance of Computerized 
Prescribing Alerts in Ambulatory Care, 13 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 5, 5 (2006) (“Many 
CDS use commercial knowledge bases to drive their alerting”). 
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the performance of DDI alert systems is disappointing and inconsistent.43  
Furthermore, CDS-system vendors and knowledge-base vendors tend to 
generate excessive warnings in order to minimize their own risk of liability, 
and such practices lead to alert fatigue and ultimately can compromise 
patient care.44 
The efficacy of DDI alerts could be significantly improved through input 
from clinical experts, as suggested by Ridgely and Greenberg.45  We agree 
with the authors that any credible expert process would have to include 
representatives of a broad range of professional organizations.46  However, 
we question their suggestion that participation by government officials may 
be inadvisable.47 
The Dutch have recognized the importance of broad-based expert input 
and cooperation between experts and government authorities.48 The 
Working Group on Pharmacotherapy and Drug Information is a twenty-two 
member multidisciplinary body that includes internists, general practitioners, 
pharmacists, and a member of the Netherlands Medicines Evaluation 
Board.49  The Working Group is responsible for maintaining the Royal Dutch 
Association for the Advancement of Pharmacy’s computerized drug 
interaction surveillance systems and for selecting which DDIs will be 
included.50 
The authors note that the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
Office of the National Coordinator (“ONC”) has already instituted a project 
called Advancing Clinical Decision Support tasked with formulating a 
clinically significant DDI list.51  The authors provide no details concerning 
this initiative, and a search of the Internet revealed little illuminating 
information.52  If Advancing Clinical Decision Support does not produce 
satisfactory results, ONC could establish a federal advisory committee, 
similar to the existing Health Information Technology (“HIT”) Policy 
 
 43. Smith et al., supra note 27, at 47; Jacob Abarca et al., Evaluation of the Performance 
of Drug-Drug Interaction Screening Software in Community and Hospital Pharmacies, 12 J. 
MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 383, 388 (2006). 
 44. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 45. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 279; see also Zopf et al., supra note 35, at 
795 (discussing the need for input from an international expert panel). 
 46. See Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 280. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See van Roon et al., supra note 16, at 1132. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 259. 
 52. See Advancing Clinical Decision Support, RAND HEALTH, http://www.rand.org/health/ 
projects/clinical-decision-support.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) (internet searching yields the 
project website, which in turn lists only the project’s four tasks, without providing further details 
on goals, method, or timeline). 
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Committee and the HIT Standards Committee, which would include 
individuals with significant medical and pharmacological expertise.53 
Any group tasked with developing DDI alert rules should be composed 
of representatives of professional medical and pharmacy associations, 
including clinicians who use CDS, as well as government officials, such as 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) employees with DDI expertise.  The 
expert panel we envision would assemble, vet, and distill relevant medical 
knowledge about DDIs into forms that meet the needs of physicians and are 
amenable to use with CDS systems.  As discussed above, the panel would 
determine which DDIs require alerts, what evidence is reliable, and what 
material should be compiled for CDS users, and it could develop DDI 
severity codes or coding algorithms.  All DDI information would need to be 
updated regularly as new research findings emerge.  The panel could also 
help to identify knowledge gaps that the federal government could address 
with targeted research funding. 
Developing and updating DDI information will require a tremendous 
amount of effort.  Ridgely and Greenberg recognize that professional 
organizations may be unable to undertake or sustain the project without 
government support, and we believe that ONC involvement would be 
critical.54  ONC would need to motivate, organize, and fund the DDI 
initiative.  Because the value of DDI alerts has yet to be proven, even a body 
of rules developed by top experts should not be widely deployed without 
clinical testing that includes the targeted end-users (e.g. primary care 
physicians, particular specialists, etc.).  The rules should be piloted in a 
number of representative settings to determine whether they are effective in 
promoting improved prescribing decisions and are not overly disruptive to 
the users. Once the merit of the DDI rules has been proven, ONC could 
incorporate the rules into future meaningful use and certification 
regulations, as Ridgely and Greenberg suggest.55  Additional or revised 
rules could be incorporated periodically through a similar process.  
Regulatory endorsement of particular DDI rules would remove vendors’ 
incentive to include other, superfluous DDI alerts that subject prescribers to 
information overload. 
 
 53. Health IT Policy Committee (a Federal Advisory Committee), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVICES, http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/community/healthit_hhs_gov__ 
health_it_policy_committee/1269 (last visited Jan. 21, 2012); Health IT Standards Committee 
(a Federal Advisory Committee), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://healthit.hhs. 
gov/portal/server.pt/community/healthit_hhs_gov__health_it_standards_committee/1271 (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2012). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 286. 
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The Netherlands system provides an illuminating case study of the 
efficacy of a central DDI authority.56  According to a 2005 report, the Dutch 
Working Group reviewed 244 drug combinations that were initially included 
in CDS systems and determined that only 160 of them actually required 
alerts.57  A 2008 study confirmed that the Dutch drug database was not 
overly inclusive, but it nevertheless found that physicians continued to 
complain of alert fatigue and wished to suppress some of the warnings.58  
Perhaps no DDI alert system will satisfy all users, and policy-makers will 
need to continue to learn about and refine this emerging technology.  
Thoughtful input from national experts, however, could contribute 
significantly to improvements of the widely criticized contemporary systems. 
III.  DDI ALERT USE AS EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 
Ridgely and Greenberg offer an additional suggestion to promote the 
acceptance of an authoritative DDI list.59  They argue that government 
intervention in the form of liability protection is needed to incentivize 
implementation and use of a national DDI list.60  To that end, they argue 
that federal legislation should create a legal “safe harbor” to protect 
physicians who make treatment decisions using a consensus-based DDI 
list.61  The safe harbor clause would establish that a clinician’s choice not to 
adopt more extensive DDI alerts could not be used against her as evidence 
of negligence or as a basis for liability.62  The authors suggest that such 
immunity should also extend to hospitals and health care organizations.63  
Furthermore, the safe harbor provision should establish that CDS system 
vendors will not be vulnerable to liability for allowing users to modify the 
scope of DDI alerts.64  Finally, Ridgely and Greenberg recommend that the 
FDA begin regulating medical software as a Class III device so that FDA 
approval will preempt state court tort actions against vendors pursuant to 
the Supreme Court’s Riegel v. Medtronic decision.65 
In our view, whether or not a safe harbor provision is sensible depends 
on what Ridgely and Greenberg mean by a “clinically significant DDI list.” If 
 
 56. See van Roon et al., supra note 16, at 1137-8. 
 57. Id. at 1137. 
 58. van der Sijs et al., supra note 2, at 447. 
 59. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 290. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 3, at 292. 
 65. Id. at 31-2; see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323, 330 (2008) (holding 
that FDA premarket approval preempts state common law claims challenging the safety or 
effectiveness of a medical device marketed in the approved form).  UPDATE 
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this is a list of always-contraindicated DDIs, it is likely to be quite short and 
minimal.66  Thus, it would be inappropriate to grant providers immunity 
based on their choice to use only the listed DDI alerts.  However, if an 
expert panel or a federal advisory committee were to develop a 
comprehensive body of DDI alert rules, adoption of Ridgely and 
Greenberg’s safe harbor proposal would be reasonable.  Carefully 
developed and continually updated DDI alert rules that were endorsed by 
ONC and perhaps even incorporated into federal regulations would justify 
protecting providers from liability based on their decision to decline to 
receive additional DDI alerts. 
At the same time, we must emphasize that providers should never enjoy 
immunity based simply on following particular DDI alerts.  Clinicians should 
receive DDI information through alerts but generally cannot be given 
complete instructions as to how they should proceed.  DDI alerts should be 
advisory only, and doctors should apply their medical judgment to 
determine the appropriate course of action.67  Patients who suffer harm 
because of physician negligence should not be barred from seeking redress. 
The courts will need to determine the extent to which a provider’s use of 
DDI alert information or deviation from alert recommendations could be 
introduced as evidence in court.68  Parties might also be able to use 
evidence concerning the reliability of particular DDI alerts in litigation. For 
example, studies that review DDI alerts in light of the contents of patient 
EHRs at the time might reveal that particular DDI alerts have high rates of 
false positives (false alarms). A false positive would be an alert that indicates 
that there is strong evidence of severe harm to patients when in truth, few 
patients suffer adverse consequences from the particular drug combination.  
This evidence might be used in defense of a physician’s decision to 
disregard an alert.  As an added benefit, collection of data about false 
positives, false negatives,69 and related statistics would generate valuable 
information about the efficacy of DDI alerts.70  Such information could be 
systematically studied by ONC and used to refine future DDI alert rules. 
The authors’ suggestion that the FDA regulate CDS software as a Class 
III device requires further qualification. Class III devices are not always 
 
 66. See supra p. 299. 
 67. See supra p. 301. 
 68. See R.A. Miller, Legal Issues Related to Medical Decision Support Systems, 6 INT’L J. 
CLINICAL MONITORING & COMPUTING 75, 78-79 (1989); see also Hoffman & Podgurski, E-
Health Hazards, supra note 36, at 1548 (discussing admission of evidence in cases where 
physicians failed to take DDI warnings into account). 
 69. A false negative would occur if no DDI alert were generated, but a patient 
nevertheless experienced an adverse reaction to a drug combination. 
 70. See van Roon, supra note 16, at 1137 (discussing how evaluation of data enabled 
the Dutch Working Group to eliminate some DDIs from CDS alerts). 
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subject to rigorous FDA pre-market approval. Rather, twenty-six Class III 
device types are reviewed under the much more lenient 510(k) process.71  
The Institute of Medicine recently issued a report that found the 510(k) 
process to be sorely inadequate and recommended that it be replaced by 
more effective review procedures.72  Class III classification alone, therefore, 
does not automatically lead to pre-market approval and to the associated 
liability protection under Riegel. 
FDA regulation would be acceptable only if CDS software were 
consistently subject to thorough pre-market approval and then to careful 
post-market monitoring, including mandatory reporting of all adverse 
events.73  In prior work, we have emphasized the critical importance of 
clinical testing and effective review procedures for EHR systems before they 
are deployed in the market and of rigorous post-market surveillance.74  
Such oversight mechanisms are particularly crucial for CDS software, 
because it can directly influence treatment decisions.75 
CONCLUSION 
Ridgely and Greenberg propose thoughtful recommendations to 
improve DDI alerts by addressing vendors’ and providers’ tendencies to 
adopt excessive warnings in light of liability concerns.  The authors wisely 
suggest that DDI alerts be overseen by a uniform expert process and that the 
product of such a process be incorporated into federal regulations.  A 
limited liability shield may also be implemented to induce vendors and 
providers to adopt the federally endorsed DDI rules.  We have emphasized 
that experts should develop flexible DDI alert rules rather than a rigid DDI 
list.  Furthermore, alerts must provide prescribers with comprehensive 
information and be considered advisory in nature.  Physicians must retain 
their discretion to interpret information and decide whether to comply with 
or reject recommendations.  Physicians would likely find an alert system that 
respects their judgment more palatable than one that assumes they will 
practice medicine by formula, and patients would likely prefer that their 
 
 71. INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH:  THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE 
PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 100-01 (2011). 
 72. See id. at 6-8. 
 73. See Medtronics, Inc., 552 U.S. at 323 (describing the FDA’s approval and reporting 
requirements for Class III devices). 
 74. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and 
Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 143-50 (2008). 
 75. Adam Wright et al., Governance for Clinical Decision Support: Case Studies and 
Recommended Practices from Leading Institutions, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 187, 
187 (2011). 
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doctors continue to use their discretion and tailor treatment protocols to 
individual circumstances. 
The efficacy of CDS systems has been questioned by many researchers 
and commentators.76  We commend continued efforts to grapple with the 
limitations of current CDS technology and to find the right balance between 
over- and under-inclusiveness of alerts.  We are hopeful that ultimately CDS 
will prove to be a reliable resource for clinicians and facilitate significant 
improvements in treatment outcomes. 
  
 
 76. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, E-Health Hazards, supra note 36, at 1546-47 
(discussing several researchers’ results and findings). 
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